Booker: who's sorry now?

Sunday 22 January 2017  



"I'm sorry", writes Booker, in anticipation of the hostile comments that he will inevitably get on the website, "but despite the euphoric plaudits which greeted Theresa May's Brexit speech on Tuesday, she could hardly have come up with a plan more utterly bizarre and potentially catastrophic".

Interestingly, in her speech, Mrs May claimed that, "all the division and discord", the country was coming together after the referendum that was "divisive at times". Those divisions, she said, "have taken time to heal".

But, on this as with many other things, Mrs May is wrong. The divisions have not healed. Furthermore, her speech has reopened or created anew divisions, splitting option sharply as to whether she is offering a winning plan or a jumbo-sized plane crash.

Certainly, Booker is in now doubt as to which side he falls, already invoking a fair number of hostile comments, but also some support. But, as far as he is concerned, she showed no real sign of understanding "the fearsome complexities of what a successful disentanglement from the EU would involve".

Many of the critics of this view seem to want to deny the very existence of these complexities. They range from the magic wand bearers, to those who believe that it will be "alright on the night", to those who live in their own fantasy worlds, where facts are elastic, and can be tailored to fit the argument.

More than anything, as we see people peel off and loftily declare that "Flexcit is dead", we see the weak-minded shying from criticising the orthodoxy. They prefer instead the warm glow that comes from a sense of "belonging" to a like-minded group, where bovine conformity with the prevailing group-think is the price of peer approval.

Unsurprisingly, therefore, the most trenchant verdict of Mrs May's speech did not come from those who, before the referendum, were quite happy to reject the unworkable idea of a bilateral agreement with the EU, or the potentially catastrophic WTO option. Suddenly, these have become acceptable and the criticism comes from the German press, led by Der Spiegel, which decided that our Prime Minister is clearly living in the German equivalent of "cloud-cuckoo land".

But, "of all the seven veils behind which she had long hidden her thinking on Brexit", says Booker, "the only one she had previously lifted was her repeated insistence that she wished us to continue trading 'within' the EU single market".

We were not mistaken on this. Mrs May was unequivocal in the use of the word "within" but she has now emphatically rejected this, along with the only practical course which would have allowed us to do so. That "EEA/Efta option" could also have given us other advantages, including the unilateral right to impose selective control over immigration at least from within the EU.

Instead, contrary to all recent experience, she imagines that, within two years, we can hammer out a one-off bilateral trade deal, comparable with that between the EU and Switzerland which took 17 years to negotiate. She seemed oblivious to how complicated and "resource intensive" such agreements are: so much so that the EU has already said it wants no more such deals with its neighbours.

Also not irrelevant is its deal with South Korea, 18 years in the making, with 1,336 pages on trading arrangements; plus a further 64-page agreement, as is usual in such deals, requiring "political co-operation" on a range of further topics.

Even this is peanuts alongside the countless other issues needing to be resolved as we disengage ourselves from the entire system of government with which we have been enmeshed for 43 years. To think that the essence all this can be achieved in two years is laughable.

Again and again Mrs May seemed wholly unaware of what she will be walking into in two months' time. She clearly hasn't begun to grasp what is technically involved in the labyrinthine system of "customs co-operation", which is what allows our goods what she called "frictionless" access to that market she wants us to leave.

She absurdly claimed that by leaving the EU we will no longer have to pay "vast contributions" into its budget. The very first demand she faces in Brussels will be how she intends to settle our outstanding debts, estimated at £60 billion, for all the ongoing financial commitments we have signed up to in the past.

Worst of all was her hubristic threat that, unless they give in to our demands on trade, we might just "walk away". She is clearly unaware of what an unthinkable disaster this would land us in since, under the rules, our goods would immediately be shut out from what is still by far our largest export market.

Even if she does get some kind of deal, it will require a hugely complex "secession treaty", plus another treaty to amend the existing European treaties themselves; each requiring unanimous ratification by all the other 27 member states.

Having now stripped off all the rest of those seven veils, she will find herself in March, to borrow a phrase, going "naked into the conference chamber". Her EU colleagues will be staring at her in disbelief.

In two years' time, Booker thus concludes, she may be praying that at least one country, say Slovenia, might save her, by vetoing the whole thing. The result of the shambles we would have made of "Brexit" might then be that, utterly humiliated, we remain in the European Union.

That last offering is, as one might expect, deliberately provocative. But it is worth considering what might happen if Brexit does crash and burn, leaving Mrs May with a disaster on her hands in the run-up to the general election.

Possibly, that would open a small window of opportunity for Corbyn, who would be poised to take advantage from Mrs May's success in trashing the Tories' reputation for economic competence. With recent memories of shortages and empty shelves in the supermarkets, the electorate might be nervous about giving the Prime Minister a new mandate.

Another possibility is that we see a re-alignment of British politics, with the centrist factions from both Labour and the Conservatives split away and form a new party, along the lines of the Social Democrats in 1981.

With the "colleagues" then poised to revise the EU Treaties, with the potential for associate membership as a new category, we could find shell-shocked voters supporting the idea of adopting this idea, as a means of undoing the damage of Mrs May's plane-crash Brexit.

For all their unpleasantness and stridence of their tones, this is something the commenters attacking Booker on the online comments simply haven't factored in. A badly executed Brexit puts us at risk of ending up back where we started, still in the grip of the EU.

The best way to ensure that there is no risk of this happening is to engineer as complete a break as is possible while ensuring a stable, prosperous post-Brexit future.

The idea of adopting the Efta-EEA option as an interim solution is a step towards that objective. To embark on the impossible venture of negotiating a complex FTA on top of our withdrawal settlement, then to craft a complex transitional package – of a nature that has never been tried before – does not seem to be in the same league.

That we should reject the former and be expected to embrace the latter is not something which strikes me as being entirely logical.



Richard North 22/01/2017 link

Brexit: trade cooperation

Saturday 21 January 2017  



It is getting to the point where, if I see another reference to concluding a tariff-free agreement with the EU, as the primary objective of our Brexit negotiations, slaughter will be done. Mrs EU Referendum has been instructed to obtain wholesale quantities of M18 Claymores, although she fears they are not currently in stock at the local Asda store and Amazon is fresh out. 

The point, of course, is that tariffs are only a tiny part of the elements addressed in a modern trade agreement, where non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are the greatest impediment to trade. At a rough estimate, the cumulative cost of NTBs, as a global average, is equivalent to a 20 percent tariff, as against the EU average for tariffs on goods coming out at around 3.5 percent.

Thus, those who prattle endlessly about tariffs are completely missing the point, their noise constituting a monumental exercise in time-wasting that we can do without. Claymores for the progenitors would be a kindness to humanity.

Mrs May herself has been speaking of a comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU, of which there are few examples – the first of the new generation being the South Korea-EU agreement. This 1,432-page document is probably a close to the UK deal as we are likely to get, establishing "a free trade area on goods, services, establishment and associated rules".

The objectives of this Agreement are: to liberalise and facilitate trade in goods, services and investment; to promote competition in their economies; to further liberalise the government procurement markets; adequately and effectively to protect intellectual property rights; and to contribute, by removing barriers to trade and by developing an environment conducive to increased investment flows, to the harmonious development and expansion of world trade.

Recognising that sustainable development is an overarching objective, the Parties also commit to the development of international trade in such a way as to contribute to the objective of sustainable development and "strive to ensure that this objective is integrated and reflected at every level of the Parties' trade relationship".

Additionally, the Parties agree to promote foreign direct investment without lowering or reducing environmental, labour or occupational health and safety standards in the application and enforcement of environmental and labour laws of the Parties.

While the zombies might be cringing at the idea of committing to sustainable development as an overarching objective, this is exactly the sort of thing that the UK delegation might be presented with as a basis for an agreement, part of a package which cannot be split.

But, although there is a "package" element to a free trade agreement, the other great myth is that the agreement can be procured in the same way that one might buy groceries from a shop, then to be placed on the shelves at home, ready to be dusted down and used when necessary.

What we see from this long report on the Korea agreement (374 pages) is that a free trade agreement is a dynamic entity, representing a strong political commitment to mutual cooperation over a wide range of issues.

As the report says, from the political point of view, Korea can be considered as a key partner for important issues ranging from security (countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; combating illicit trade in small arms and light weapons; combating terrorism) to economic issues (trade and investment; economic policy dialogue; business cooperation), environmental issues (climate change and chemical policy) and cooperation in regional and international organizations.

Furthermore, it cannot be said that the agreement emerged out of nowhere, with Commission officials deciding one day to jump on an aeroplane to Korea with a trade deal in the briefcases. Relations between the EU and South Korea have been developing since 1960s. Diplomatic relations were established in July 1963 and the permanent mission of Korea to the EEC was opened in November 1965.

There followed a Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue in October 1996 under which a formal system for regular economic and political cooperation was established. Then came two bilateral agreements: the Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters, which entered into force in 1997, and the Framework Agreement on Trade and Co-operation, which entered into force on 1 April 2001.

In the intervening years, however,. the EU had been focusing on developing multilateral trading agreements via the WTO but, with the Doha Round in the doldrums, the EU decided to review its trade policy, producing a Communication labelled Global Europe, leading to a new trade agenda. The outcome was a shift in emphasis from multilateral to bilateral deals, with priority given to the emerging Asian economies. South Korea was high on the list 

In April 2007, FTA negotiations with Korea were started. This led to a new political framework agreement signed in May 2010 and, after eight rounds of formal negotiations, on 6 October 2010 the FTA was signed. It provisionally entered into force on 1 July 2011 and was ratified in October 2015. As of 1 July 2016, import duties were eliminated on all goods except a limited number of agricultural products.

Interestingly, the formal FTA negotiations had taken three-and-a-half years, 18 months more than the two-year Article 50 negotiations. Yet the FTA was not an isolated event, started from scratch. It stemmed the 1996 deal which was added to in 2001, the three deals forming a continuum.

What is particularly important here is that the agreements were reached in the context of "strong mutual governmental dedication", although not without controversy. And while negotiations are over, we see a network of routine contacts, while the Parties meet periodically in high-level summits. Additionally, a Korea-EU Troika foreign ministers' meeting has been held annually in the margins of the UN General Assembly and ASEAN regional forum since 1990.

This is such a contrast to the confrontational atmosphere which is characterising relations between the EU and the UK that one wonders how a similar agreement can be replicated, and then maintained, without the good will that held over the EU-Korea talks. For negotiations to be successful, there must be wholehearted cooperation, not confrontation. And there's not a lot of the former in Brexit land at the moment.



Richard North 21/01/2017 link

Brexit: it's the money stupid!

Friday 20 January 2017  



One interesting thing about Mrs May's speech is that the more you look at it, the less depth it has. As Lost Leonardo puts it, this is a woman who shows scant sign of understanding the scale of the task on which the country has embarked. 

The errors alone should tell one that this is a woman who has not mastered her subject, while her supposed negotiating strategy demonstrates a profound lack of clarity, and troubling lack of awareness of what makes the EU tick. She does not seem to have given any consideration to where the "pinch points" are likely to be. 

A knowledge of EU history and of our troubled relations with the Community, however, will quickly draw attention to the early days and the "Bloody British Question". And that will give some clues as to how the battle lines might be drawn up. The early disputes were, of course, about money, culminating with Thatcher's great victory in 1984 at Fontainebleau on the rebate - more than a decade after we had joined the EEC.

As we live, so shall we die. It has always been the case that front and centre of any exit negotiations was going to be the money question. I have been long been predicting on this blog that the "colleagues" would put the financial issues at the top of the agenda, and make a settlement here conditional on dealing with all the other matters.

For Mrs May, therefore, there was the opportunity of uttering some emollient phrases, reassuring the "colleagues" that their concerns were understood, and that the UK was quite prepared to discuss a reasonable severance package, in accordance with the UK's treaty obligations and in a way that did not damage unnecessarily Union spending plans.

Such may not have been music to the ears of the zombies, but the UK is about to enter a complex series of negotiations, on which the prosperity of the nation quite literally depends. Now is not the time to make war-like noises addressed entirely to a domestic audience – and certainly not when, as Mrs May did, you have invited the ambassadors of the other 27 EU Member States to hear your speech, first hand.

But, rather than take the intelligent, diplomatic course, Mrs May chose belligerence. In her one and only reference to Union finances, she told her audience that, "because we will no longer be members of the single market, we will not be required to contribute huge sums to the EU budget".

Apart from the fact that we do not contribute specifically for the maintenance of the Single Market – and were funding the Community budget long before the Single Market even existed (witness Mrs Thatcher's Fontainebleau triumph), this was perhaps marginally acceptable to the "colleagues" in representing the eventual outcome of Brexit, but for what wasn't said.

Instead of referring to outstanding issues, Mrs May merely added that: "There may be some specific European programmes in which we might want to participate", adding, "If so, and this will be for us to decide, it is reasonable that we should make an appropriate contribution".

That, in itself, was clumsy phrasing, and not a little provocative. There is going to be a negotiation and it is for the UK to propose participation in some of the European programmes, but it is for the "colleagues" to decide whether they are prepared to allow the UK access. And they will then propose the price, to which the UK would have to respond.

With that, the Prime Minister concluded that, "the principle is clear: the days of Britain making vast contributions to the European Union every year will end" – again a somewhat provocative statement. It is something of a value (quite literally) statement to assert that the contributions are "vast", and if required for domestic consumption, then the pill could have been sweetened with an offer to deal on outstanding issues.

The inference, of course, is that payments are to stop altogether (apart from programme costs), but the lack of anything else has opened up a situation where the EU response is bound to appear confrontational. This is the way Mrs May – unwittingly or not – has set it up.

And, according to The Times, it has not been long in coming. Yesterday, Joseph Muscat, the Maltese prime minister, currently holding the EU's rotating presidency, made it clear that the UK will have to sign up to EU divorce terms for Brexit. This included a bill of up to £60 billion, which will have to be settled before talks on a trade agreement can begin.

This is exactly what we were saying on Wednesday and hinting at in December. But it also something the UK cannot pretend is a surprise. We were given notice by Wolfgang Schäuble last November. Mrs May was extremely unwise to ignore this issue.

Returning to The Times, we see reported Mr Muscat setting out the "mechanics" of Brexit to MEPs in Strasbourg, but then warning Theresa May "not to belittle" the difficulty of the Brexit talks. "It will be an arduous task", he says, "as our recent experiences with trade agreements suggest. There should never be an underestimation of this task".

Painting a picture so clear that even the Brexiteer zombies should be able to understand it, Muscat then said: "We want a fair deal for the United Kingdom but that deal necessarily needs to be inferior to membership", noting that, "This should not come as a surprise to anyone". Thinking it can be otherwise, he said, "would indicate a detachment from reality".

To a very great extent, though, Mrs May has driven a very large truck up a narrow cul-de-sac, with no room to turn round at the end. And it also appears to be a truck with no reverse gear. Thus, having deprived herself of room to manoeuvre, they fear the Prime Minister will treat the financial demands as her trigger to walk away from a "bad deal".

Her problem will be that the "colleagues" will see it as eminently reasonable that the UK is asked to honour annual payments until the end of the 2020 MFF period, and then contribute to the reste à liquider commitment, plus other outstanding issues, such as pension liabilities.

On the other hand, it takes no great genius to understand the domestic sensitivities of this issue for the UK and it is going to be politically very difficult for Mrs May to make any concessions. But, if there is to be any progress, then concessions there will have to be. To avoid making this appearing to be a humiliating climb-down, the Prime Minister needs to be preparing the ground. Yet there is no sign of her doing that.

Expressing his concern at things to come, we are treated to the views of an EU diplomat, via The Times. "To say she'll walk away hints she will not pay her £60 billion", he says. "If this is the case, how can she strike a good deal on trade? This is only the beginning of negotiations. I hope it is not going to be as bumpy as she hints".

And since all of this is taking place while the clock is ticking, we need to take note of Swedish prime minister, Stefan Lofven, who suggests that two years would be "too short" a period to agree both the divorce agreement and a trade deal. And this is without the talks stalling over the payment issue.

Unsurprisingly, Lord Kerr has also pitched in on this, suggesting that there could be "a one in three chance" that Brexit negotiations will end with no deal between the UK and the European Union. This he says, will result in "serious economic disruption and a degree of legal chaos".

He also warns that the financial negotiations would be "very nasty". "Article 50 is not about trade", he says, "it is about divorce. It's about paying the bills, dividing the property. The money negotiation is going to be a very nasty negotiation".

Lord Kerr then goes on to predict there will be "no serious negotiations before the autumn", adding he expects "this calendar year will be mainly spent in a furious battle about money".

If we ever get past that hurdle, it now looks as if the remaining time will be spent on a series of sector-by-sector transition arrangements with phased rendezvous dates as Britain diverges from the single market with further negotiations foreseen after the Article 50 talks post-2019 to reach what is being called the FTA+.

The aim, it would appear, is to make a political decision on the date that the FTA+ comes into force. This could be as late as January 2025 according to some or as early as 2022 according to David Davis, the Brexit minister.

This, actually, does not compute, and there is still a massive elephant lurking in the room – a secession treaty on which a phased withdrawal will rely for its legal base. A Free Trade Agreement is a treaty in its own right, and this can include details of a phased introduction. But the EU treaties will also need amending, and it hard to see how this can be achieved other than by a full-blown secession treaty.

Then, of course, there is much more to the Article 50 settlement than just trade. Potentially, as we have pointed out, there are 35 "chapters" under which talks may have to be marshalled, with much of the substance coming outside matters covered by an FTA.

According to Article 50, the Treaties cease to apply "from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement" or, failing that, two years after the original notification. It is fairly clear that the FTA, itself, covers the future framework and cannot be the withdrawal agreement.

From this, it seems, that the FTA must be written up in some detail for it to take effect at the same time that we drop out of the relevant parts of the Treaties, suggesting that all this work must be completed within the two-year deadline.

The possible alternative is that the withdrawal agreement is held off and does not come into force until the FTA has been agreed and is in force. If we're talking about 2022-25, then we'll still be in the EU by the time of the general election, and still paying "vast" contributions to the EU budget.

Dare one suppose that Mrs May might by then be seeing the wisdom of taking up the Efta-EEA option, which gives us the trading continuity that we need while being firmly outside the EU.

Otherwise, Mrs May could find herself in Saint Augustine territory (the man who asked of God, "Grant me chastity, but not just yet". I doubt whether the electorate will be forgiving of a message declaring: "Brexit means Brexit, but not just yet". It doesn't have quite the same ring as the original.



Richard North 20/01/2017 link

Brexit: Global Europeans

Thursday 19 January 2017  



While we are beginning to see a reaction to Mrs May's bizarre claim that we can conclude a free trade agreement with the EU inside two years, there is another area that needs some really serious scrutiny.

This is the glowing, fluffy-bunny claim, expressed in her speech that she wanted "this United Kingdom" to be "a truly Global Britain". We are to be a country that reaches beyond the borders of Europe and "goes out into the world to build relationships with old friends and new allies alike".

The idea behind this, of course, is that we will compensate for the inevitable loss of trade with the EU Member States with increased business from other parts of the globe. Embellished by Liam Fox today, May's preferred outcome is that we become "a great, global trading nation that is respected around the world and strong, confident and united at home".

These two, of course, go hand in hand, but not in the way Mrs May might hope for. The world works in very different ways to the way it is painted by the free trade zombies.

I got an insight into this when, for over a decade, I worked for three trade associations, covering the egg, meat and cheese industries. One of those was the UK Egg Producers' Association, representing about 20,000 small producers, some of whom were general farmers who kept poultry, and some specialists.

Most of the eggs were produced by caged hens and a major cost at the time were the EU battery hen welfare regulations, which required considerable capital expenditure to service a market where the returns were already perilously slim.

As such, one might have expected a considerable backlash against "EU regulation" in general, and the EU in particular. But, in fact, industry-wide, there was no great hostility, but for a complex variety of reasons.

Firstly, in the downstream period after the Salmonella and eggs scare induced by junior health minister Edwina Currie, we had seen a torrent of UK law, much of it draconian, ill-thought-out and extraordinarily damaging. The intervention of the EU into the legislative field actually brought a degree of rationality and stability, shaving off some of the rough edges from the UK law and removing a few of the more obvious absurdities. At another level, no supermarket will buy produce that was not fully compliant with EU law

Secondly, from a purely protectionist stance, the fact that EU laws, and especially those on welfare, were stricter than US laws was welcomed. The economics of the industry were such that the US giants could produce eggs at anything up to 15p a dozen cheaper than European producers, while shipping them over in a Jumbo jet would cost about 5p per dozen. Put simply, if the UK market was opened to the US, the domestic egg industry would cease to exist.

Then there was a third, particularly interesting element. Very few of our producers actually exported directly to Europe or anywhere else, but the industry as a whole needed to export in order to stay profitable – and for that, virtually all producers had to comply with EU law.

The issue here was the spring flush. Although commercial laying birds are far distant from the original jungle fowl and live in completely artificial environments, they still go into high gear in the Spring (their natural laying cycle), whence egg production peaks.

This period, though, also matches Easter, one of the periods of highest egg demand – but not exactly. Before the Easter demand takes off, the hens are already in overdrive (especially if Easter is late). Producers watch nervously as a national egg surplus build up, and prices teeter on collapse. With predatory supermarkets, they can easily end up selling at less than the cost of production.

Fortunately, there is an answer – export. For reasons that were never clearly explained to me, the Dutch demand cycle was slightly different to that of the UK, taking off earlier in the year before the hens got going. Thus, by the early Spring, we could usually anticipate an egg shortage in Holland, driving up the prices there.

What then would happen was a number of entrepreneurs would contact UK farmers and buy up the entire UK surplus for a few weeks, and strip the wholesale market. They would fill up a number of containers for transport to the Dutch market. Because of regulatory harmonisation and the emerging Single Market, that had become a simple operation, allowing the price to be stabilised. For many egg producers, the money they then made represented their profit for the entire year.

The point here is that most of the time, most egg producers did not export. But they all needed to comply with EU rules, so that when market stabilisation measures were needed, their surpluses could be exported - even those bought off the wholesale market. And to add to that, the EU was keeping out the Yanks.

Bluntly, at the time, the last thing the egg industry wanted or needed was to drop out of the Single Market. Whether things are different now, I don't know, as I've lost touch with the industry. But I do know that producers would oppose the UK signing up to a free trade deal with the US – one that gives access to our market for agricultural goods. Not only the egg industry would be wiped out. Beef and milk producers would also go, alongside poultry meat and pig producers, plus many others. Meanwhile, a trade deal with New Zealand could wipe out UK lamb production.

Unsurprisingly, a trade deal with the US is not going to happen. By the time the Guardian and others have finished with their exposés on US livestock welfare standards, with cattle crammed in feedlots of a 100,000 or more head (pictured), there is no way a British public is going to accept US produce. And if we did, we would find it very difficult to export manufactured food products to EU Member States unless we could guarantee exclusion of US imports.

Interestingly, disparities in agricultural standards have (in part) been holding up TTIP and it is those same standards which have historically hindered agreement on trade deals between the US and Europe. Our regulatory regimes are just too different. There is no chance of harmonisation.

It is not only in agriculture, though, that this problem is going to be met. Two years ago, I was writing about international tyre standard, where the Europeans and the US had failed to reach agreement on a global standard via UNECE, handicapped by the differences in regulatory philosophies.

For this very reason, there has been no progress on the harmonisation of type-certification for vehicles, and no common code for the approval of pharmaceuticals. We also see significant differences in the regulation of biotechnology and financial services. Even philosophical differences in the regulation of toys create barriers between the two blocs.

This is not just – or at all – a problem of differences in wording between regulations (although such differences do not help), but in the use by the Europeans of the precautionary principle in relation to scientific uncertainty, to block the release of products. This compares with a legal obligation for US regulatory agencies to provide strong and reliable scientific evidence and to undertake economic cost-benefit analysis, when considering product approvals.

More generally, the European emphasis is on rigorous pre-release certification, conformity with which largely indemnifies producers from civil liability in relation to risks covered by certification. This compares with less proscriptive release requirement in the US, but with manufacturers exposed to civil action in the event of failure.

These differences will not be easily reconciled. As Hammond said over the weekend, we have largely adopted the European social and taxation model. But he could also have reminded us that we have adopted the European regulatory model as well. And such are the differences between that and US practice that it is very difficult to service both markets, unless volumes are high enough to sustain the additional costs.

When one adds to this the behaviour of different markets where – as the egg producer example illustrates – the UK industry is fully integrated with its European counterparts, the reorientation of UK trade is not going to be that easy. To become more "global", it will first need to become less "European", and that's going to take a little time – time we haven't really got.



Richard North 19/01/2017 link

Brexit: a Jumbo-jet crash

Wednesday 18 January 2017  



There has been much speculation as to whether we would be exposed to a car-crash or a train-wreck Brexit. But what Theresa May appears to be giving us with yesterday's speech is a Jumbo-jet crash (perhaps an Airbus A-380) on top of Whitehall.

Although some might regard that as an improvement, or might want the epicentre to be moved to the Palace of Westminster, the underlying message is clear. Mrs May has set her face against a rational, measured Brexit and is embarking on a wild gamble, the outcome of which she has no way of predicting.

Such is her idea of pursuing "a bold and ambitious Free Trade Agreement with the European Union", an undertaking which others have tried in the recent past – the most recent being Canada, which has spent eight years now in trying to bring an agreement to fruition, and we're still waiting. The possibility, therefore, of the UK negotiating a deal (and getting it ratified) inside two years is, to say the very least, remote.

Nevertheless, there are those who think otherwise. They argue that, because the UK is already in the EU and achieved full regulatory convergence, transition from one type of agreement to another should be relatively straightforward and swift.

That, however, is completely to understate the complexity of modern trade agreements. In addition to regulatory convergence, there must be a dynamic arrangement that will ensure the automatic uptake of new regulation, and also the changes mandated by ECJ judgements. There must also be internal market surveillance measures, agreed conformity assessment measures, customs agreements, dispute settlement procedures, agreements on competition policy, procurement and intellectual property rights, as well as systems to deal with rules of origin.

These and much else, will require an institutional structure to facilitate communication and ongoing development, a form of arbitration panel or court, and a consultation body, which allows input into, and formal communication with the EU's regulatory and institutional system.

With modern trade deals, there is also a huge element of conditionality, where parties are required to subscribe to common values on human rights (one of the main barriers to a free trade deal with China), on workers' rights, on environmental protection, wildlife protection and many other incidental matters.

Not for nothing do we see over 300 heads of agreement in the EU-South Korea FTA, of which regulatory issues are but a small part. And on this agreement, negotiations started in 2006 and the final agreement entered into force on 1 July 2011. However, this was only the last stage of a process which had begun in 1993. Delivery of the current 1,336-page trading agreement, alongside a broader-ranging 64-page framework agreement on political co-operation, took almost 18 years.

In the comments on a previous post, I have likened the commitment to securing a free trade agreement (signed and ratified) within two years, as akin to a British commander addressing his troops on Salisbury Plain, telling them they are to invade Iraq the next day – but they have to walk all the way from the UK.

This is my way of saying that to achieve a "bold and ambitious" free trade agreement with the EU inside two years is not just difficult. It is impossible. It cannot be done. And it doesn't matter how many times it is discussed amongst the chattering classes, it still can't be done.

And as if that is not bad enough, Mrs May is also talking about a transitional agreement, a "phased process of implementation, in which both Britain and the EU institutions and member states prepare for the new arrangements that will exist between us will be in our mutual self-interest".

The point here is that she tells us she wants us to have reached an agreement about our future partnership "by the time the 2-year Article 50 process has concluded". That will, of course, have to include ratification of her "bold and ambitious" FTA, a unanimous decision which includes some devolved governments. But only then can the transition process be planned.

This in itself will be complex – far more so than people imagine. We are not signing up to a new treaty, de novo, or extending an existing treaty. We are transitioning from a very complex treaty organisation, out of the EU treaties, into a completely different relationship bound by an entirely new treaty. For a seamless transition, that is going to require changes to the EU treaty, by way of a separate succession treaty, which itself is going to require unanimous agreement and ratification.

Assuming that we get our FTA inside two years – which I've already suggested is impossible – we then have this further hurdle, a complex additional treaty, against an unknown and unspecified timetable.

In what appears to be a sideways swipe at the Efta-EEA option, Mrs May nevertheless rails against a transitional status, "in which we find ourselves stuck forever in some kind of permanent political purgatory". This is one of many places where she has quite evidently supped liberally at the Brexiteer kool-aid. How can it ever be permanent when we can leave the EEA with one year's notice? 

But where she has sated herself with the kool-aid is in her comments about membership of the Single Market. "European leaders", she avers, "have said many times that membership means accepting the 'four freedoms' of goods, capital, services and people".

"And being out of the EU but a member of the Single Market would mean complying with the EU's rules and regulations that implement those freedoms, without having a vote on what those rules and regulations are. It would mean accepting a role for the European Court of Justice that would see it still having direct legal authority in our country".

Says Mrs May, "It would to all intents and purposes mean not leaving the EU at all", speaking straight out of the Janet and John playbook on the "Norway option". But if Norway is most decidedly not in the EU, and is a member of the Single Market, how is the same arrangement for the UK keeping it in the EU? To claim that represents a total departure from reality.

And it is there that the German media finds her, with several journals suggesting that she has entered a fantasy world. Spiegel describes her as realitätsblind, which one of our commenters says you could translate as "in cloud cuckoo land".

The Germans appear considerably less than impressed with May's threat to "walk away", and her assertion that: "no deal for Britain is better than a bad deal for Britain". They are right to be unimpressed. As Pete has pointed out, this is not something the UK can sensibly walk away from. The Article 50 process is a matter of negotiating an administrative de-merger. Absence of a deal would create an impossible situation.

But if Mrs May does "walk", it is straight into the WTO option, the dangers of which she apparently dismisses on the basis that "we would still be able to trade with Europe". She does not in any way acknowledge the administrative complications that would arise, or the very real danger of a complete collapse in trade with the EU Member States.

Yet, if we were excluded from "accessing" the Single Market (i.e., trading with EU Member States), she seems to believe that there would be adequate compensation conferred in our ability "to change the basis of Britain's economic model". Missing completely, though, is any sense of timescale. While the effects of the WTO option would hit us within days, it could well be years before positive effects (if any) were felt from a new economic model. And what do we do in the interim? Rather than an answer, as always, there is silence.

Where there is no silence - and perhaps there should have been - is over Mrs May's comments on the EU's Customs Union. She repeats the error that full Customs Union membership prevents us from negotiating our own comprehensive trade deals. She then gets tangled up in the further misunderstanding about border controls - which lie outwith the customs union. The woman knows nothing, and has learned nothing.

She wants, or so she says, cross-border trade to be as frictionless as possible, not realising that border controls were only removed with the Single Market, the very thing she wants to extract us from. Inexplicably, she adds, "that means I do not want Britain to be part of the Common Commercial Policy and I do not want us to be bound by the Common External Tariff".

This is a confused person, one who goes on then to tell us that "these are the elements of the Customs Union that prevent us from striking our own comprehensive trade agreements with other countries".

In a small shaft of light, though, she then tells us she wants a customs agreement with the EU, but then – bizarrely – tells us that: "whether that means we must reach a completely new customs agreement, become an associate member of the Customs Union in some way, or remain a signatory to some elements of it, I hold no preconceived position".

This is almost akin to the Pope revealing that he has no "preconceived position" on Catholicism, mainly because he doesn't really understand it. And if Mrs May is out on her own, where the hell have her advisors been, feeding her this tosh? How can any nation possibly be an "associate member" of the customs union?

Pete picks up with his own analysis, as does Sam Hooper, so the final point I will make in this analysis, which is the first of what will have to be several over the next few days, concerns the money. Says Mrs May, "because we will no longer be members of the Single Market, we will not be required to contribute huge sums to the EU budget". This is issue illiteracy. We pay as members of the EU, not as members of the Single Market. And neither do Efta-EEA members pay into the EU budget.

What then follows in Mrs May's comments is worrying. "There may be some specific European programmes in which we might want to participate", she says. "If so, and this will be for us to decide, it is reasonable that we should make an appropriate contribution. But the principle is clear: the days of Britain making vast contributions to the European Union every year will end".

One can accept that the "principle" is clear. But we might have expected the Prime Minister to be a little more forthright about what else we are going to have to pay – not least for the decentralised Banking and Medicines Agencies. These, we are probably going to lose, but we will still want to participate in them, plus many others. But they get no mention. Nor does the equivalent of EEA/Norway grants, or even RAL.

It is my expectation that the "colleagues" will put the money issue up-front in the negotiations and, in respect of trade and other issues, insist on conditionality. We either agree to pay up, or the negotiations go no further. And despite the glib talk about the EU exporting more to us, it has been made perfectly clear that the integrity of the EU will come first. Even German industrialists and politicians are prepared to take a hit to preserve that.

Given the immediate reaction of the German media, I don't think Mrs May's threats will carry much weight. If the UK threatens to "walk", the "colleagues" will stand aside and let it happen. The UK is not the only entity that can restructure its economy. There are plenty of Eastern and mid-European nations which would be happy to pick up the slack.

All in all then, my view of Mrs May's speech is that it has been a giant misstep. If she has introduced clarity and a certain amount of certainty into the debate, it is at the cost of the UK's credibility. As such, her speech yesterday may turn out to be the most expensive and ill-conceived uttered by any politician since the war.

Looking back to recent events, one perhaps now has a better idea of why Ivan Rogers resigned. One might also take the view that the wrong person resigned. Whether the men in grey suits come calling, to invite Mrs May to book a trip to the Palace, remains to be seen. But every day now that she remains in No 10 will add to the growing sense of disaster.


Comments: a record number of 700+ on the previous thread shows what happens when this blog becomes so completely marginalised, as we are told it has. To continue our marginalisation, I have closed down the previous thread leaving this thread open, so avoiding duplication and (additional) confusion.



Richard North 18/01/2017 link

Brexit: a car-crash plan

Tuesday 17 January 2017  



Mrs May tells us she wants to build a great global trading nation. To that effect, she will pursue a "bold and ambitious free trade agreement with Europe". And what she is proposing "cannot mean membership of the Single Market". And, she believes: "No deal for Britain is better than a bad deal".

The woman has sucked up the kool-aid and reproduced all the worst aspects of the Westminster bubble prattle. We are so totally fucked.



Richard North 17/01/2017 link

Brexit: Theresa "Humpty Dumpty" May

Tuesday 17 January 2017  



"When I use a word", Theresa May said in rather a scornful tone during today's speech, "it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less". So, when I say that we do not seek to adopt a model already enjoyed by other countries, it means exactly what I choose the word "model" to mean.

You may care to use the words "Norway model" to describe rejoining Efta and retaining our position as a contracting party to the EEA Agreement. But, to me, a "Norway model" looks rather like the picture above. If choose to call the Efta-EEA idea the "Norway option", then it is an option, not a model. And you don't need Humpty Dumpty to tell you that "model" and "option" are different words, with different meanings.

If you want to take my words literally, you're going to have a serious problem anyway. After all, you could call a free trade agreement a "model". And since other countries have enjoyed this "model" in their trading relations with the EU (if "enjoyed" is the right word to use), I could not possibly entertain, or even enjoy an FTA with the EU.

On the other hand, if we look in detail at the structure of the EEA Agreement, you will find that the basic core is the Agreement itself, but much of the detail is contained in the attached protocols and annexes, which are very much part of the treaty.

You will also find that each of the Efta members, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, have defined their own specific terms via country-specific references in these attachments, which effectively make them unique – bespoke agreements for each of the countries.

In that respect, I could easily define a "bespoke" agreement with the EU via the EEA Agreement. With multiple protocols and annexes specific to the UK, it would be unique to this nation. And it would not be a "model". It would be the real thing, 1:1 scale.

Similarly, going for the Efta-EEA option means that we are truly out of the EU. It is practically and legally impossible for the UK to be a member of Efta and also hold EU membership. Efta-EEA membership is not partial membership of the European Union. It is not associate membership of the European Union. It does not leave us half-in, half-out. 

- - - -

So much for Mrs May's speech. As to whether she is going to make use of the Efta-EEA option, and thus avoid a "hard" Brexit, no one out here actually knows. She could very easily kill the controversy by stating, unequivocally, "I will/will not withdraw from the Single Market", or words to that effect.

If she does not use those specific words, and makes no direct reference to the Single Market, then it means she is keeping her options open. And if she is keeping her options open, that means nothing has been settled – whatever the legacy media might report.



Richard North 17/01/2017 link

Brexit: the cheating Lyons

Tuesday 17 January 2017  



For those of us who trail in the wake of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (see page 9) and regard stupidity as a social phenomenon rather than a congenital defect (like an infectious disease, with transmission characteristics similar to STDs), Dr Gerard Lyons is an excellent subject for study.

This is the man who, in August 2014, while he was still working for the current Foreign Secretary, wrote a treatise called The Europe Report – a win-win situation. Amongst the gems he offered was the claim that: "Article 50 explicitly states that the other remaining members of the EU would decide the terms of the exit, not the country that is leaving", thus confirming Bonhoeffer's thesis.

In considering how we would leave the EU, Lyons also argued that the UK should "be proactive in seeking an amicable separation", to which effect he suggested that "not invoking Article 50 would make more sense". It could be seen as "starting with a clean slate in determining the future relationship with Europe".

Basically, all the mad nostrums that were floating around at the time, Lyons Hoovered up and regurgitated on the pages of his report. This led us to conclude that it was a "disgustingly superficial piece of work, technically illiterate, flying in the face of treaty provisions, written under the hand of a man who is as ignorant of the EU as his master".

The thing about Lyons and his ilk, though, is that they occupy their own, intellectually sealed bubble, where contact with the outside world is rigorously controlled and anything but unconditional adulation is totally ignored. Even more temperate criticism from prestigious sources doesn't make the cut, so that where – as was averred – he makes errors of judgement and fact, these remain uncorrected.

I like the measured tone of the piece that tells us that Lyons "states factually that every IMF Chief has been a European and every World Bank President an American". Writes George Magnus, "Jim Yong Kim might beg to differ. He is a South Korean by birth and current President of the World Bank. This doesn't mean Lyons's case for Brexit is irrelevant, but it betrays an inattention to detail".

That same "inattention to detail" had Lyons claim that "the terms of the Norwegian Option [the EEA Agreement] were negotiated by Norway in anticipation of joining the EU, but its people subsequently decided not to join".

This is so absolutely and demonstrably untrue that one despairs that it is so often trotted out – not least because, as we record here, the EEA Agreement stemmed directly from the Oslo Declaration of March 1989 as Efta's response to the plans of Jacques Delors on the completion of the Single Market. The Agreement was crafted as an alternative to EU membership, not as a preparation for it. The Norwegian political elites subsequently tried to join the EU because the EEA Agreement (in refusing common decision-making) did not satisfy their ambitions.

The persistence of this myth illustrates the refusal of Lyons and the co-denizens of his bubble to engage with the outside world. Their arrogance - in assuming that their flawed and often totally inaccurate versions of events represent the truth - makes them the dross they are. But it also ensures that their work will continue to be riddled with errors, false assumptions and the clinical stupidity with which we are all too familiar.

At the time he produced his 2014 report, I wrote of Lyons that he and his like had done us one small service. They had shown us with absolute clarity that the establishment was not the place to look for a workable EU exit plan.

Yet, such is the continued arrogance of the man that, fortified with his own ignorance, he has teamed up with fellow illiterate, Liam Halligan – the "leading Telegraph economics commentator" - to produce a report on the eve of Mrs May's speech. This one is called "Clean Brexit" – purporting to be the very thing he has shown himself incapable of doing – a workable EU exit plan.

In this, we get the ritual demolition of the Single Market (couched as the "Norway option"), with the same tired arguments. Nothing of the debate of the last two years has percolated the man's excuse for a brain.

But it is a measure of how successful we have been in shaping the agenda that Lyons adds to his diatribe by introducing what he calls the "Liechtenstein model". This is what he has to say about it:
Liechtenstein, despite EEA membership, has negotiated its own tailored EU immigration policy, leading some to suggest it could act as a model for Britain outside the EU but retaining Single Market "membership". Liechtenstein, though, is a rather densely-populated microstate, while the UK is the second-largest EU economy and a major immigrant destination.

It is almost impossible, given growing public disquiet across the EU relating to Schengen, that the EU27 would grant the UK the perceived economic benefits of EEA/SM membership, while waiving "freedom of movement". Were Britain to gain such a concession having voted for Brexit, that would fuel already growing demands for EU referenda across other large members states - something Brussels and incumbent EU leaders are desperate to avoid.
Such as this is a more than adequate demonstration of the arrogance of Dr Lyons - and also his almost complete lack of understanding of this subject. Like so many, while he is forced to acknowledge the issue, he does not identify the main source of argument. Instead, he misrepresents it and, in two short paragraphs, purports adequately to have responded to 20 pages of the closely-reasoned argument here and here.

It is this approach which poisons the debate. Lyons sets himself up on high as the arbiter of a sterile argument which he himself defines, having run away from the real issues and avoided engaging with knowledgeable critics. He speaks only to his adoring claque from whom he gets no dissent.

Those less inclined to adoration, however, might note that in 2014, this much-revered man was promoting a comprehensive free trade agreement as "the most likely UK option". Negotiations would be "improved by the threat of Article 50", in which the UK would push for full market access. And that was a serious proposition.

In the view of the Great Man, it was unlikely that the EU would grant full access, a position which he conceded was "not optimal". Despite that, he thought that the "bespoke negating (sic) relationship" would give the UK "the broadest possible operating environment from which to pursue its post exit future".

What is interesting from today's perspective, though, was – in 108 pages – the minimal reference to the WTO option. With only seven mentions, the most substantive comment was when Lyons took note of an Open Europe observation that: "Britain is unlikely to face what some may call a worst case scenario of having to fall back on World Trade Organisation rules".

As a baseline for the current report, this could not be more extreme. With his "Clean Brexit", the UK would pass its "Great Repeal Bill", when the Article 50 window expires. Outside the Single Market and the customs union a Clean Brexit also means, he says, "we are able to walk away without a deal from the Article 50 negotiations, if any deal which is offered is poor".

The UK Government, Lyons avers, should say we are fully prepared to trade with the EU27 outside the Single Market and Customs Union, under WTO rules, with so-called "Most-Favoured Nation" status - "so the EU cannot legally discriminate against the UK, even if some Commission bureaucrats say that might happen". Thus, in the space of less than three years, we have seen an almost complete volte face.

Nevertheless, it is not for the Great Lyons to set out the consequences of a "walk away" policy. All we learn from him is that, if the EU insists on WTO-tariffs on UK goods and services, the UK will retain those tariffs on them in return. "And because we know we can walk away, that should encourage the UK to keep the Article 50 negotiations as simple as possible, giving us the scope to seek sector-specific deals - and that, indeed, is what we would advocate", he says.

It was three years ago that we were discussing this in Flexcit, pointing out the simple truth that, if the UK walks away from the table without an agreement, it confers on itself "third country" status. As such, the EU is obliged to levy its WTO "bound" tariffs. This happens automatically – the EU has no choice.

Then, if UK chooses to match these tariffs, levying them on imports from the EU, in order to conform with WTO rules against discrimination, it must levy the same tariff rates on other MFN partners – in practice all other counties. The Chancellor would enjoy the hit, but it would not do much for the prices index or the "just about managing".

That Lyons apparently doesn't know these basics is the price he pays for his self-induced intellectual isolation. You can ignore your critics, but that means you are doomed, groundhog day-style, endlessly to repeat the same mistakes. He shares this handicap with Peter Lilley who grandly acquaints us with the schoolboy howler, that under MFN terms, "our exporters would pay only £6.5 billion tariffs to continental governments". Does he really not know that importers, not exporters, pay the tariffs?

As much embedded in cloud cuckoo land, though, is Lyons. Under his "Clean Brexit", with the UK "trading under WTO rules with the EU if a separate agreement has not been reached", he actually believes "our exporters would have access to, but not membership of, the Single Market".

The fatuity of this statement almost beggars belief, even if we know what he is trying to say. The man is attempting to convey that we would still be able to trade with enterprises in EU Member States. What he doesn't state are the terms and conditions, and how hard it would be to get our goods into those markets.

This is actually cheating. Unless you are prepared to identify the difficulties and barriers that a preferred option might encounter, and state in some detail how you could overcome them, you are not being straight with your readers.

Being anything but straight, Lyons avers that his Clean Bexit is "quick and predictable" and "helps make leaving the EU as smooth as possible. This is a travesty of a claim. The WTO option would almost certainly precipitate a crisis. 

Yet, the man says, "by acknowledging we will be outside both the Single Market and Customs Union now, the Government can then also put policies in place for changes we know need to happen by the time Article 50 expires - avoiding the 'cliff edge'". What he doesn't say is how we convince the EU Member States to adopt policies which will allow us free access to their markets.

If we go back to 2014, the policy option that Lyons then preferred was the comprehensive free trade agreement. What we're getting now is that declaring Clean Brexit: "allows ministers and officials to reach out to various sectors for their on-the-ground advice, helping the Government to secure long-term UK-EU trade arrangements that ultimately benefit our people".

As we sift through the verbiage, we then get to the kernel: "the UK intends to leave both the Single Market and the Customs Union, as part of our broader exit from the EU". On top of that, Lyons says: "We should also make clear that while we are very happy to trade with the EU under WTO rules, as a consequence of a Clean Brexit, we would also be willing to strike UK-EU sector-specific deals of mutual benefit".

But, the man says, "to assume that the UK must strike any form of trade deal with the EU, though, during the two-year Article 50 window, would be a major strategic error". He tells us: "There is no need at all for the Government to attempt to shape any form of trade negotiation between now and March 2019, if the EU27 is not so inclined".

We cannot leave it there without stating that these "sector-specific" deals with the EU would almost certainly breach WTO rules, which means that even if the UK tried to pursue them, the EU would probably refuse to play. Thus, what we are basically left with is the UK operating under WTO rules in respect of trade with the EU, with nothing much else. This is supposed to sustain us while we expand trade links with the rest of the world.

The madness of this approach speaks for itself. In the thousands of words we have written on this subject, we have been at great pains to point out the pitfalls. No one has, sensibly and honestly, attempted to argue our points or come up with a credible rebuttal. But Lyons doesn't even try. He does what the rest of the bubble-dwellers do – he simply ignores them. He does not even concede that there might be any problems.

This is not only madness – it is fundamentally dishonest. It speaks of a system that is also dishonest, which survives only because it rigs the debate and excludes critical comment. Halligan, as the co-author, is a journalist, ostensibly committed to free speech. But he is part of that system too, one that seeks to shut down debate rather than entertain it.

As we hear Mrs May's speech later today, we can pause to reflect how much dishonesty and outright stupidity has been poured into attempts to influence her. If it succeeds and we even get close to what Lyons has in mind, we are in serious trouble.



Richard North 17/01/2017 link

Brexit: an epidemic of complacency

Monday 16 January 2017  



One of the oddest things I've been finding in my background research on the potential effects of a "walk away" from the Article 50 negotiations, leaving us relying solely on WTO rules, is how little information or discussion there is on the potential consequences.

There is an endless procession of people saying we should "just leave" and take up the WTO option – the latest being Bill Clarke in the letters column of The Sunday Telegraph, who says there is no need to reach agreement with the 27 EU Member States. But, like the idiot Goodman in Conservative Home, it is perilously clear that Clarke and most of the others advocating a "walk away" can have no idea of what this entails.

These people, it would seem, not only want us to jump off the edge of a cliff, they want us to do it blindfold and in the dark, mentored by people who are unable to tell us whether the ledge gives way to a six-inch or thousand-foot fall. And merely to ask is to be condemned for making things needlessly complicated.

This was very much the case with my research on the haulage industry and Brexit. Google those terms: "haulage industry" and "Brexit" and it is remarkable how little material there is. Then, most of the stuff produced, from trade or legal sources, is extraordinarily generalised, verging on the complacent. Throughout, one sees the assumption that any difficulties that might be encountered will be sorted out in the negotiations.

By coincidence, to add to my work, we now have a BBC article - repeated in the Independent and elsewhere - which warns that "people flying to the UK could face 'severe disruption' after Brexit unless the Border Force employs more people".

The warning comes from the Airport Operators Association (AOA) which is concerned that the creation of a "hard" border for the nationals of EU Member States would require extended processing times arising from more stringent passport checks, and result in longer queues at immigration control.

The AOA, which represents more than 50 UK airports, complains that a growth in air traffic has not been matched by an increase in resources for Border Force. Even without Brexit, this has already led to longer queues at passport desks. In 2015, a record number of 251 million passengers were processed through Britain's airports. Yet Border Force staff numbers fell from 8,332 in 2014-15 to 7,911 in 2015-16.

The coming problem, according to the Independent, is that EU nationals arriving in the UK are currently screened through a "soft" border – an identity verification that generally takes less than 25 minutes. Non-EU passengers are required to go through a "hard" border, which assesses whether they have the right to enter. This can take considerably longer – often up to 45 minutes.

If all overseas passengers have to be intensively screened, it is feared that this could lead to an increase in waiting times. Any such increase would be "highly disruptive" for passengers, airlines and airports. Airports would also have to spend millions of pounds on extra facilities for immigration checks. Tourism volumes - a major export earner - might be affected.

Almost needless to say, the official line is dismissive. A Home Office spokesperson says: "We are about to begin negotiations with the EU and it would be wrong to set out further positions in advance, but we are clear that Border Force has the capacity to meet passenger demand and maintain security".

Now, there are several points that arise from this. Firstly, there is the Home Office assumption that there will be negotiations. However, in the "walk away" context, there will be no [successful] negotiations with the EU – a "hard" border would be an inevitable consequence.

Secondly, although it has been suggested, pre-referendum, that UK citizens would be unaffected in British airports, it optimistic to suggest that they would be spared any disruption. Despite Home Office assurances, the Border Control is not meeting its targets. And with a common resource, the more intensive processing of nationals of EU Member States will require additional staff. Doubtless, they will be drawn from the general pool – with inevitable knock-on effects. At the very least, if more staff is employed, million-pound costs increases must be anticipated.

The third point to bear in mind is that any disruption is unlikely to be confined just to airports. It has already been suggested that the Channel ports could be affected. And as we have recently seen, the disruptive effect that even modest changes to passport controls can bring are substantial. Added to customs clearance hassles, the impact could halt the flow of traffic.  

The fourth point is that, if we decide to impose a more rigorous regime on our Continental neighbours, as night follows day UK citizens will be treated in a similar fashion when they seek entry to EU Member States. And just because more resources will be required to handle extra checks, that does not mean that European authorities will necessarily provide them.

Where there has been a breakdown in negotiations and the UK has decided to walk away, in the acrimonious aftermath one can hardly expect the French State to dole out millions of euros, just to give UK tourists an easy time – especially when French citizens are suffering considerable delays. And with talk of visas and the payment of fees in order to travel to EU Member States, the delays could multiply.

Perversely, nothing of this was foreseen by the Association of British Travel Agents, which published a report in March 2016 (pre-referendum) on the potential effects of Brexit on the travel industry. Its concern was of "a high likelihood of uncertainty during the negotiation period immediately following the referendum". "This", it said, "could last until a replacement set of trading relations and regulations were in place, which could take several years".

Even then, this was styled by the Daily Mail as a "disaster" for tourism. But not for one minute was it thought that the UK could walk away from the table without a deal – or that it might happen accidentally as a result of our negotiators running out of time.

Mind you, one has to wonder at the competence of ABTA officials who, along with Deloitte, wrote the report. They assert that a "leave" vote would trigger "two years of negotiations among the remaining EU Member States to agree the terms to be offered for a continued trading relationship with the UK". It then said: "The UK could not take part in these negotiations".

It was only months ago that this level of stupidity was being taken seriously by the media and politicians – another canard to fall by the wayside, only to be replaced by many more. Small wonder that there is so much uncertainty about outcomes.

More recently, there seems to have been an epidemic of complacency with Terry Williamson, CEO of hotel consolidator and inbound service provider JacTravel saying: "I am still exceptionally positive about this industry, both outbound and inbound".

Thomas Cook's UK boss Chris Mottershead, said: "There are actually more impactful areas that we have to deal with on a daily basis, whether it's a terrorist attack, or a volcano, you name it. There is always something this industry has had to deal with over the years and actually has done remarkably well in dealing with it". With that, he said, "I don't think this is any different in reality I don't see the significance of the impact of Brexit having the same impact as some of the others".

Against this, a trade press editorial recently warned the travel industry that it needed to re-think its place in the world given the multiple challenges facing the world. "The geopolitical realities of our world" – of which Brexit was one - "are worth embracing by the travel industry, instead of ignoring them or, worse still, wishing them away", it said.

It does seem, however, that the ignorance of the "walk away" advocates is being matched by an unwarranted degree of industry complacency – across the board. It appears that very little thought is being given to the impact of a complete breakdown of talks.

It is perhaps this, more than anything else, which is contributing to the air of unreality, whereby the risk of a "hard" Brexit is being understated. Should people start realising what is actually involved, there might be a very different political climate. The AOA report might be the first sign of this happening.



Richard North 16/01/2017 link

Booker: the Ridge line

Sunday 15 January 2017  



Sunday week last feels a long, long time ago, making the debut Sophy Ridge show a thing of the distant past. Oddly enough, according to a puff in the Guardian, her aim was "to show how politics affects those outside the Westminster bubble". In that, at least, she failed.

Instead, the facile woman went for the easy shot, trying to get Mrs May to admit that we would "leave the single market". And when the Prime Minister contradicted her and said wanted us to remain "within" the Single Market, Ridge took this as confirmation of our leaving, triggering a further costly slump in the value of the pound.

But, says Booker, in his latest column, had Ms Ridge been more on the ball, she would have pounced Mrs May's words and asked how, outside the EU, such a thing as remaining "within" the Single Market was possible.

She could have pointed out (as Booker has been doing consistently) that there is only one conceivable way in which, on leaving the EU, we could still do this. That is by rejoining the European Free Trade Area (Efta) to remain, like rich Norway, in the European Economic Area.

Says Booker, there are no ifs or buts here. Despite the efforts of so many to deny it, this is the only solution that ticks all the boxes of what most people say they want from Brexit. While freeing us from three quarters of the EU's laws, we could continue participating in the single market as we do now, thus avoiding a catastrophic disruption to our trade.

We would, he says, no longer be subject to the European Court of Justice. We could regain selective control over immigration from the EU. We could negotiate independent trade deals with the rest of the world. And we would buy ourselves time to discuss all those 30 other major policy areas needing to be resolved in the mere two years allowed for negotiations.

Ms Ridge may have got her headlines. But if only she'd been clever enough to ask the right question, she might just have prodded Mrs May into saying something more meaningful than all those vacuous headlines suggested. Now we must await Mrs May's promised speech this week to see whether we get more substantial clues than anything achieved by that silly interview.

Already, though, the mice are nibbling at the corn, with the Sun on Sunday claiming that Mrs May is expected to announce the UK "is prepared to leave the single market, the customs union and European Court of Justice".

Relying on "senior sources", the paper is able to divine that Mrs May will unveil her "secret masterplan" (should it be mistressplan?) for a "swift and clean" Brexit, and declare: "We're on our way out". Thus are we to get a "triple whammy departure from the EU to be triggered within 75 days": out of the single market, out of the customs union and out of the control of European judges.

The other Murdoch title, the Sunday Times, says much the same but at greater length. It is also declaring that Mrs May will announce that Britain is seeking a "clean and hard" Brexit, pulling out the Single Market and the customs union in order to regain control of immigration and end the jurisdiction of the ECJ.

This is the bog-standard media trope which has not changed in months since promotion to the collective "line to take", now having become "the Ridge line", to coin a phrase. However, in the ST story, David Davis adds to this, telling us that a "transitional deal" is on the cards. According to him, if necessary, the government will "consider time for implementation of new arrangements".

No more than speculation at this stage, this is embellished by the Sunday Telegraph which decides that Theresa May is "to side with Eurosceptics in major Brexit speech revealing what she wants from negotiations". Once again the trope emerges unscathed, with May supposedly seeking to appease the Eurosceptic wing of her party. The same phrasing emerges, as she contemplates a "hard", or "clean" Brexit.

But, in the Telegraph's case, their front-page lead is all based on the most tenuous of threads – not even on sources inside government. We now have to depend on "sources familiar with the prime minister's thinking". Whatever that might mean, it marks a new low in this journal's diminishing claim to be a purveyor of news.

Written before it got its hands on the Telegraph story and copied it out, the Guardian website was recording this "intelligence" as a "growing expectation". So, effectively, we're not being told the news, but simply what the media pack thinks might be the news on the day.

For all the speculation, the only thing substantive the media have to go on is an excerpt of the speech, described as "light on specifics". This has Mrs May calling for an end to the division and the language associated with it – "leaver" and "remainer" and all the accompanying insults. We must all "unite to make a success of Brexit and build a truly Global Britain" - as if.

Meanwhile one former "remainer", Nick Clegg, is calling for Mrs May to go for a "Norway-style trade deal", even if he seems somewhat confused about what is involved. He lauds Efta for allowing its members "the potential to suspend rules on free movement if a case can be made for doing so". In his whole article, the EEA is not mentioned.

This Sunday, therefore, the entire politico-media nexus is living up to its unenvied reputation for ignorance and ill-informed speculation. They make it up as they go along to compensate for the lack of facts, copying off each other in a frenzy of coprophagia, as they all feed off the same inventions.

Building of the torrent of speculation, the Independent builds the next stage of the fabrication. It pitches in inviting reactions from politicians to the event that has not yet happened. Thus it has Tim Farron tell us: "This speech proves that Theresa May is driving the country towards a divisive and destructive exit from the European Union".

"If the UK had voted 52-48 to remain you can bet that Theresa May would never be pushing towards a hard Remain. There would be no embracing of the Euro, no joining the Schengen Zone", he says. "But the Prime Minister seems hell bent on ripping up everything we share with the European Union no matter how damaging that is to the UK".

We also get Anna Soubry saying: "The Government has no mandate for this. To go into the negotiation conceding on the single market and the customs union is extremely serious and very bad news".

Following the example of the Independent, the Mail on Sunday adopts a similar stratagem, using Nicky Morgan to respond to an as-yet-undelivered speech. She believes that leaving the single market "would exact a disproportionate economic toll on UK businesses due to lost trade opportunities".

With all that, there is obviously no need now for the Prime Minister to give her speech. The media and the politicians have already decided what's in it and, in the style of Sophy Ridge, even if she says something completely different, they can ignore it and tell us what she "really" said.

On the other hand, we might just wait until Tuesday to see what she actually says. Even if we are not pleasantly surprised, at least we will be better informed.



Richard North 15/01/2017 link
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