10/08/2014
There is something desperately self-regarding in the sudden
media interest in Iraq. But those, like
Lord Dannatt, who argue that the West has a "strong moral obligation" to Iraq, stemming from the invasion of Iraq in 2003, need to revisit their history, and in particular
the history of the British occupation of southern Iraq.
Specifically, they need to recall that the UK area of operations extended only to the southern sector. Apart from some special forces and other minor activities, we had no responsibility for the affairs in central and northern Iraq, and were never charged with dealing with the Sunni insurgency.
On these grounds alone, now to expect UK intervention in northern Iraq is illogical. We had no responsibility for the area in the recent past, so why should be assume any responsibility for it now, other than that which any concerned nation might take, alongside all the others which had dealing with Iraq.
The second, more important issue, though, stems from our occupation of southern Iraq after the 2003 invasion when, through a series of deliberate decisions, we adopted a policy of "managed retreat", abandoning the territory to the Shi'a insurgency, and the malevolent grip of the Mahdi Army.
In this the hypocritical Lord Dannatt, played a key role, arguing in
October 2006 that the British Army should pull out, during an interview in
The Daily Mail.
It was the Dannatt strategy that led progressively to the withdrawal of British troops to their bases, and thence to the single base in Basra airport, leaving the Mahdi Army free to mount their reign of terror throughout the south, massacring Christians and members of the rival Sunni sect, without so much of a murmur of protest from Gen. Dannatt.
Only when Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki took the gamble of his career, and mounted the operation "Charge of the Knights", to reclaim Basra, March 2008, and then recaptured al Amarah in June 2008 â after it had been abandoned by the British in August 2006 â did the tide of the war begin to reverse in the south.
It was the inability of the British to get a grip on the insurgency, and its lacklustre performance in Basra, that led Maliki to insist on the complete withdrawal of British forces by the end of July 2009, a defeated army which to this day still has not come to terms with its own failures.
For the British, therefore, this was not a case â as
Tim Montgomerie insists â of "betraying" Iraq by "leaving too early". UK forces were kicked out in 2009 by the Iraqi government, after failing to perform.
Nor was it the case that Obama rushed to pull US troops out of Iraq prematurely. The decision to withdraw was made by President Bush in
July 2008, to which effect in
December 2008 Bush and Maliki signed a "Strategic Framework Agreement and Security Agreement", which committed the US to withdrawal.
Even then, in 2011, when US troops finally withdrew, Obama had been prepared to leave a detachment in the country, but for
Maliki's refusal to afford legal immunity for US personnel.
Throughout the occupation, the US-led coalition has been keen to respect the restored sovereignty of Iraq, and the democratically elected government, in which context the reason coalition troops are no longer stationed in Iraq is because they have been asked to leave.
However, the Iraqis were gifted a considerable amount of military equipment, and their military formations had been restructured and trained. And in two major operations (and many more besides) had shown themselves capable of extending the writ of the Baghdad government.
To a very large extent, that we are now seeing what amounts to a re-emergence of the Sunni insurgency represents an egregious failure of the sovereign Iraqi government and its own military. We bear no more responsibility for that than does any other external agency. But, if we did, that responsibility ended once our forces were told to leave the country.
If now, there are calls for assistance on humanitarian grounds, then these should be treated favourably, and we should do what we can to reduce the impact of this appalling situation â one which, incidentally, has been developing over a period of months.
But, in terms of military assistance, it may have registered with some that we have been undergoing a major contraction of our armed forces, which leaves our military weakened and with very little capacity for foreign adventures.
If we add to this, the ongoing inability of the Army to manage its re-equipment programme â admirably recounted by the website
Think Defence - and the very real competency issues, thrown up by the Iraqi occupation and then again in Afghanistan â and we have to come to terms with the fact that we no longer have a military which is capable of operating effectively in an expeditionary role.
Not least of this, Mr Cameron has already committed a battlegroup to Poland for autumn exercises, in response to the Ukraine crisis, which just about absorbs any expeditionary capacity that we might have had available.
Sending a token military force to Iraq â which has not as yet been requested by the Iraqi government â is, therefore, all we could manage. But what we would be able to send would not be decisive. And with the proven Sunni capabilities for mounting asymmetric warfare, it might do nothing more than guarantee the flow of flag-draped coffins and a run of coroners' inquests.
More crucially, we must recognise that that our current inability to intervene stems from decisions made over the last decades. If we believe that the UK should be capable of robust intervention in situations such as these, then different decisions should have been made. There is no point in now demanding action when the capability does not exist. We should have insisted that the capacity was made available, years ago.
And that is the grown-up point. Decisions â for good or bad â have consequences. Actions, and inaction, also have consequences. Over the decades, we have allowed our military capabilities to degrade, and many of those who should have known better have been silent in the face of egregious military failure, when critical voices should have been raised.
The consequences of this are now plain to see â the unfolding of a terrible tragedy, in which we are powerless to intervene with effect. But then to demand what we can no longer do is not grown-up politics. We made our decisions, and we must live with them. And so indeed must the Yazidi Kurds except that they must also die for them. That is what "consequences" is all about.
FORUM THREAD
