16/05/2015
Matthew Parris in
The Times is coming out into the open, suggesting his own fudge on the EU referendum. He argues that both the "yes" and "no" camps (or "in-out") should get behind Mr Cameron's "renegotiation" and then, only in the event that the outcome is unsatisfactory should the "no campaign" pitch in and argue the case for leaving the EU.
This, in fact, is a meme which is being floated quite widely within the Conservative "eurosceptic" caucus, where it is argued that it is tactically vital to give Cameron full support for his attempted re-negotiation.
Politically, Tory MPs feel they cannot afford to be seen to be rocking the boat at the moment. They are right behind the idea of a referendum but they don't want publicly to make too many sceptical noises about Cameron's prospects.
Privately, however, they tell us that they all know that Mr Cameron will not come back with anything worth a row of beans. So, when they see nothing but cosmetic concessions, that will be the time for them to come out in the open. Then they will be free to point out how pitiful it looks when measured against all that fluffy talk of negotiating a "new relationship for Britain with the EU".
In the interim, these Conservatives say, activity should be confined to planning and setting up a grand "rainbow alliance", ready for action when the time comes.
In reviewing this strategy, however, one has to observe that, if it is supported by Matthew Parris â an ardent Europhile - there has to be something wrong with it. As such, we could hardly be expected to take strategy advice from the opposition, without thinking it over very carefully beforehand.
In this case, one can readily see that there is a huge trap awaiting the "wait and see" brigade. The self-denying ordinance, clearly, will only apply to them. While they sit on their hands, the "inners" will be rampant, stoking up the FUD, as they have been doing for many months. What Parris is suggesting gives a massive advantage to the "inners".
Even without that, though, the "Parris" strategy is still one that is guaranteed to ensure that we not only lose, but lose badly - for reasons which include the following:
1. It concedes the high ground, tacitly accepting that there are circumstances in which continued membership of the EU would be acceptable. It thus throws away our strongest suit - that there is a fundamental mismatch between the UK and the EU and that subordination to a supranational authority is not acceptable as a matter of principle.
2. It would fracture the anti-EU movement, creating even more of a schism than already exists. Those of us who are opposed to the EU on principle could not possibly endorse this strategy, which means that there would inevitably be divisions in the "out" camp. Not least, it is hard to believe that any Ukip supporter could get behind this strategy â yet the people who are proposing it are those calling for a "big tent" approach.
3. It hands the initiative to Cameron. If, like Wilson, Cameron finalises his deal late into the campaign, the "no" campaign will be on the back foot, having had to hold its fire until it has seen the details of the deal. That means that there will be insufficient time to argue the case, which in any case will be dangerously weak (see 1 above).
4. It turns the campaign into an argument about the finer details of our "relationship". This is exactly the way the Climate Change argument has gone, creating an exclusive, self referential clique, rehearsing arguments which have no traction with the general public. This is an argument we cannot possibly win - it will rely on prestige, and is one where the government can always trump anything and anyone we put into the fray.
5. It lacks vision. We would be arguing on Cameron's turf, for a very small and limited number of changes which, even if attained in their entirely, would not amount to very much. They would not constitute the "sunlit uplands" vision necessary to overcome the status quo effect, and thus accord with the Stokes precept. A more expansive vision would have no credibility, as the campaign would already have signified that it would accept a mess of potage.
Furthermore, it is unwise to assume that Mr Cameron will necessarily come back from Brussels with empty hands - or lacks the ability to talk up what he does achieve, and make it look more than it is.
In terms of the renegotiation, all but a very few seem unaware of the options open to Cameron, and his ability to present a plausible package. Using the Article 48 "simplified procedure", he is able to negotiate a new treaty within the timeframe afforded. If this is padded out with political declarations and then augmented by documented Commission Proposals and supported by the European Council, Mr Cameron will be able to present a very credible "deal" which will look very convincing.
To that effect, I fully expect most of the media - and especially the
Telegraph and Times - as well as the
Daily Mail to support the package and to advise its readers to vote for continued membership. Backed by the likes of Boris Johnson and most of the Tory "big beasts", the "outers" would be on the back foot, fighting to make up lost ground.
Thus, the best way of countering Mr Cameron's tactics â as I see it - is to get in early, warning people what to expect, in an attempt to pre-empt the propaganda and diminish it. To wait until he delivers his package, and only then to attack it, is leaving it far too late. It is a disastrously weak strategy.
With that, there is also another crucial element here. Despite some individuals assuming that they have a God-given right to nominate themselves as leaders of the "out" campaign, the designation of the "lead campaigner" for each of the propositions rests with the Electoral Commission.
Yet, as we have
already pointed out, one (of two) of the qualifying requirements is that the putative leader of the "out" campaign must "adequately represent those campaigning for that outcome".
Here, though, Parris is recommending that the "outers" should only be committed to the fight if and when the renegotiations fail to deliver an acceptable outcome. Any organisation representing such a position can hardly pass the hurdle set by the Electoral Commission. Against a competitive bid, representing mainstream euroscepticism, it will be out on its own.
If therefore, the Conservatives feel the need to adopt the "wait and see" approach, they are best off forming their own party organisation, separate from the main "out" campaign. There can be no "big tent" as long as there is such a wide divergence of views - not that such an idea was ever a practical proposition.
