EU Referendum


EU Referendum: immigration at record levels


28/08/2015



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Perhaps one of the more interesting things about yesterday's ONS release of migration figures was the relatively low-key response.

The news in itself is far from happy. Net long-term international migration for the 12 months ending March 2015 stands at 330,000, up 94,000 from the same period last year. Immigration is recorded at 636,000 (up 84,000) and emigration at 307,000 (down 9,000), the net figure representing a statistically significant increase from the 236,000 recorded in the year ending March 2014, and is the highest net migration on record.

Net migration of EU member state citizens increased to 183,000 (up 53,000), with a gross of 269,000 (up 56,000). The total included 53,000 Romanian and Bulgarian (EU2) citizens, almost double the 28,000 in the previous 12 months. There was also an increase in non-EU net migration to 196,000 (up 39,000), with the gross increasing to 284,000 (up 23,000).

For a slightly different period, to the year ending June 2015, there is another important statistic.

Compared with the 636,000 people coming here (in a slightly different period), there were 25,771 asylum applications (main applicants). For all the turmoil and publicity about migrants at Calais, this represented an increase of ten percent compared with the previous 12 months (23,515). Furthermore, the number of applications remains low relative to the peak number of applications in 2002 (84,132) - just before the conclusion of the Le Touquet Treaty.

The largest number of applications for asylum came from nationals of Eritrea (3,568), followed by Pakistan (2,302) and Syria (2,204). Of the total applying, 11,600 people were actually granted asylum or an alternative form of protection. That amounts to less than two percent of the gross total (1.8 percent) and three percent of net migration.

The main thing that comes over from these raw data therefore is that non-EU immigration exceeds immigration from EU Member States. The least of the problem is that which is given the greatest amount of attention and publicity – asylum seekers. Such is the effect of the media obsession.

Focusing on the real issues, we can see that the greatest problem is non-EU migration – which is not mandated by the EU and which would be unaffected by withdrawal from the EU. And these are most likely to become permanent migrants, as opposed to incomers from EU member state, the movement of which tends to be relatively fluid.

But with now eight million foreigners permanently resident in the UK (defined as those born outside the UK of non-UK parents), no one can argue that this government – any more than the last – has the immigration problem under control.

Measures such as tightening up the housing market and enforcing the minimum wage are slow to take effect, and are of relatively minor effect compared with the "pull" of relatively higher-paid jobs in a buoyant economy. But there is no case for saying that leaving the EU, per se will remove the problem, when so many immigrants are from non-EU countries.

Business interests are claiming that they need the constant flow of immigrants to keep the economy buoyant, but they so often speak with forked tongue. Cheap incomers put a damper on the wage increases that would occur where labour shortages arise, and save on training costs and other overheads arising from employing indigenous labour.

On that basis, the over-riding impression is that the government is not actually committed to reducing immigration, and is merely going through the motions – a situation that seems hardly likely to change should a referendum result bounce an unwilling David Cameron into leaving the EU.

The essence, therefore, has to be that EU membership is not the dominant issue when it comes to immigration. Arguably, the root of the problem is a government that is not yet convinced that immigration should be substantially reduced, and is not committed to taking action to keep numbers down.

To that extent, the focus on the EU could not only be a distraction, but a dangerous one. Linkage of immigration and EU membership by anti-EU campaigners could backfire if and when we fail to win the referendum. The implied approval of continued EU membership might be taken as agreement to the current levels of immigration from EU member states.

Either way, it cannot be assumed that concern for the increasing level of immigration will necessarily translate into opposition to the EU. Even if it does, we have no evidence that any such concern will reflect in greater support for leaving the EU.

As White Wednesday and others have remarked on their Twitter accounts, we see immigration increase, while support for the EU remains stubbornly high – go figure. To the extent that immigration is a government problem, as Peter points out, we are better keeping the issues separate.

The best we can argue is that leaving the EU would enable us better to focus on solutions at regional and global levels but it would be unwise to assert that leaving, per se, will bring us any direct relief.